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INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE 1
Yanbai Andrea Wang (“amicus”) is an assistant
professor at the University of Pennsylvania Carey
Law School, where she teaches and writes about civil
procedure and transnational litigation. Her article,
Exporting American Discovery, 87 U. Chi. L. Rev. 2089
(2020) (“Wang”), provides a groundbreaking and
comprehensive study of the nationwide operation of
28 U.S.C. § 1782 in lower courts since this Court’s
2004 decision in Intel Corp. v. Advanced Medical
Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241 (2004). She submits this
amicus curiae brief to offer her academic perspective
for this Court’s consideration as it addresses the scope
and application of Section 1782 and the Intel decision.
INTRODUCTION AND
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Rather than expressing a view on the issues raised
and ably briefed by the parties, amicus submits this
brief to inform the Court of the extensive scholarly
research and analysis she has conducted regarding
Section 1782 proceedings since this Court’s seminal
decision in Intel. As the Court itself recognized in
All parties have consented in writing to the filing of this brief.
No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and
no counsel or party made a monetary contribution intended to
fund the preparation or submission of this brief. The University
of Pennsylvania Carey Law School provides financial support for
activities related to faculty members’ research and scholarship,
which helped defray the costs of preparing this brief. (The School
is not a signatory to the brief, and the views expressed herein are
those of the amicus curiae.) Otherwise, no person or entity other
than the amicus curiae or her counsel has made a monetary
contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of
this brief.
1
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Intel, over time, it would need to clarify and refine the
factors set forth in that decision in light of “further
experience with Section 1782(a) applications in the
lower courts.” 542 U.S. at 265. That is precisely the
experiential evidence that amicus’ scholarship
provides. The upshot of that scholarly analysis is that,
as Section 1782 applications have proliferated, the
lower courts have struggled to apply the Intel factors
as this Court had envisioned. Thus, if the Court rules
that commercial arbitrations, whether foreign or
international, 2 fall within Section 1782’s ambit, this
case presents a perfect opportunity for the Court also
to clarify how lower courts should apply the
Intel factors in all Section 1782 proceedings.
Especiallyin the context of Section 1782
applications submitted by parties to an international
proceeding (as opposed to those made by the
international tribunal itself), lower courts have
frequently found themselves constrained in their
ability to analyze and apply the Intel factors. In
particular, because applicants often do not notify the
The amicus notes that the terms “foreign” and “international”
refer to two separate categories of courts and tribunals. A
“foreign” court or tribunal is one located outside the territory of
the United States and operating within the legal framework of a
foreign jurisdiction. An “international” court or tribunal is a
cross-border institution operating within the framework of
international law. An “international” tribunal may be located
within the territory of the United States and, as such, would not
be considered “foreign.” Since the distinction is not significant to
the points raised in this brief, the terms “international tribunal”
and “foreign tribunal” are both used as shorthand for the
disputed language from Section 1782, “a foreign or international
tribunal.”
2

3
international tribunals or the other parties to the
international proceedings of their application, the
federal courts tasked with adjudicating those
applications are unable to conduct an informed
assessment of the critical Intel factors addressing
whether the international tribunal is receptive to
discovery assistance from U.S. courts or whether the
request is an effort to circumvent discovery
restrictions in the international proceeding. That lack
of information is exacerbated by many courts’ practice
of placing the burden of proof on the Section 1782
target who is resisting discovery, rather than the
applicant. Typically, the discovery target is a
nonparty to the international proceeding and is thus
poorly positioned or completely unable to provide the
information necessary for the lower court’s
assessment of the Intel factors.
These practical problems can be solved by two
simple clarifications from this Court. First, the Court
should clarify that Section 1782 applicants must
notify in advance the discovery target, all parties, and
all tribunals involved in the international proceedings
in which the requested evidence is to be used. Second,
the Court should clarify that the Section 1782
applicant bears the burden of proof to establish that
the request should be granted under the Intel
factors. Both of these requirements are clearly within
the Court’s authority, and both are fully consistent
with the Federal Rules’ approach to domestic
discovery.
Moreover, those two clarifications would resolve
many of the policy concerns that appear to animate
lower court decisions that have excluded international
commercial arbitrations from Section 1782’s
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reach. By ensuring that discovery targets, the
opposing parties, and the international tribunals are
notified in advance and have an opportunity to express
their views on a Section 1782 application, district
courts will be able to deny those applications where
the international tribunal itself is not receptive to U.S.
discovery. And by placing the burden on the party
requesting the discovery, the analysis would weed out
weak or abusive applications that might currently be
granted simply because some lower courts currently
place the burden on a nonparty from whom discovery
is sought—who is in a particularly weak position to
provide the information required to conduct the
Intel analysis.
Ultimately, this approach—of clarifying the Intel
factors to require notice and properly placing the
burden on the applicant—is a far preferable way to
prevent misuse of Section 1782 than drawing an
artificial and ill-defined line between “public” and
“private” arbitrations. Indeed, that line does not
stand up to the reality of modern international
arbitration. On the contrary, because virtually all
international arbitration is conducted within the
framework of international treaties or other intergovernmental agreements, the line between “public”
and “private” arbitral proceedings is an illusory
one. Any effort to articulate such a line would
illogically exclude many commercial arbitrations from
Section 1782’s reach while leaving materially
indistinguishable proceedings—such as investor-state
arbitrations—within the statute’s bounds. The more
logical and practical approach, in light of the years of
experience since Intel, is to clarify and strengthen the
Intel analysis.

5
ARGUMENT
I.

As Section 1782’s Use Has Surged, Lower
Courts Have Struggled To Apply Intel’s
Discretionary Factors In A Meaningful
Fashion.

In the years since this Court’s seminal decision in
Intel, the use of Section 1782 for discovery in aid of
international proceedings has exploded. Between
2005 and 2017, the number of discovery requests
received nationwide for use in international civil or
commercial (as opposed to criminal) proceedings
quadrupled from approximately 50 to 200 annually.
Wang, 87 U. CHI. L.R. at 2111. Section 1782 permits
requests to be made either by “a foreign or
international tribunal” or by “any interested person.”
The latter group—a class overwhelmingly consisting
of parties to the proceeding, but also including other
persons with participation rights in the proceeding,
Intel, 542 U.S. at 256-57—has experienced a
significant surge. 3 The lower courts have struggled
immensely to apply the Intel factors in response to
such party requests. If the Court rules that Section
1782 applies to international commercial arbitrations,
this case presents a perfect opportunity to refine and
clarify the Intel factors’ application in all contexts.

3 Fewer than 1% of requests come from “interested persons” who
are not parties to the underlying proceedings. Wang, at 2113.
Accordingly, this brief focuses on requests by “interested
person[s]” who are parties to the underlying proceedings, or
“party requests” for short.
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A. Practical Experience Has Shown That
The Lower Courts Have Struggled to
Conduct the Analysis Required by Intel.
As the use of Section 1782 has expanded, the
number of requests originating from parties now
exceeds the number originating from tribunals.
Wang, 2113-14. Indeed, party requests have given
rise to nearly all appeals of Section 1782 decisions in
the past decade, including each of the decisions
resulting in the circuit split now before the Court. See,
e.g., Servotronics Inc. v. Rolls-Royce PLC, 975 F.3d 689
(7th Cir. 2020), cert. granted, __S. Ct.__, No. 20-794,
2021 WL 1072280 (S. Ct. Mar. 22, 2021); Kiobel by
Samkalden v Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP, 895 F.3d
238 (2d Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 852 (2019);
Grupo Mexico SAB de CV v. SAS Asset Recovery, Ltd.,
821 F.3d 573 (5th Cir. 2016); Suzlon Energy Ltd v
Microsoft Corp., 671 F.3d 726 (9th Cir. 2011). And
nearly all the requests linked to international
commercial arbitrations come from parties.
Yet, party requests pose unique difficulties for the
lower courts that are tasked with applying the factors
set forth in Intel.
Structurally, requests from
tribunals tend to be straightforward and homogenous.
Almost all tribunal requests seek discovery for use in
a single pending litigation before a foreign court, and
more often than not that litigation concerns a family
law matter. Wang, 2115, 2109. Moreover, when a
request comes from a tribunal itself, it is self-evident
that the international tribunal is receptive to U.S.
discovery assistance, even where the tribunal’s own
discovery rules differ from those in the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. Accordingly, virtually all tribunal
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requests are granted—approximately 99% in 2015.
Wang, 2122. And rightfully so.
By contrast, party requests derive from a variety
of different claims, in differing procedural postures,
within divergent types of international proceedings.
As a result, it is typically much less clear whether the
international tribunal is receptive to U.S. discovery
assistance when a request comes from a party. In
some circumstances, party requests raise the specter
that a party might arbitrage different systems of
discovery to obtain evidence using Section 1782 that is
neither needed nor wanted by the tribunal with
jurisdiction over the dispute.
That is because
“[d]iscovery in the federal court system is far broader
than in most (maybe all) foreign countries.” Heraeus
Kulzer, GmbH v. Biomet, Inc., 633 F.3d 591, 594 (7th
Cir. 2011); see also National Broadcasting Company,
Inc. v. Bear Stearns & Co., Inc., 165 F.3d 184, 191 (2d
Cir. 1999) (“Few, if any, non-American tribunals of
any kind, including arbitration panels created by
private parties, provide for the kind of discovery that
is commonplace in our federal courts.”).
The complexities inherent in party requests often
make it difficult for lower courts to conduct the
analysis this Court articulated in Intel. As the Court
is aware, it identified the following factors to guide
lower courts’ consideration of Section 1782 requests:
•

Whether the requested evidence is
“unobtainable absent § 1782(a) aid,” which
is likely when the target from whom
discovery is sought is a “nonparticipant[]
in the foreign proceeding [and] may be
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outside
the
foreign
jurisdictional reach”;

tribunal’s

•

“[T]he nature of the foreign tribunal, the
character of the proceedings underway
abroad, and the receptivity of the foreign
government or the court or agency abroad
to U.S. federal-court judicial assistance”;

•

Whether the request “conceals an attempt
to circumvent foreign proof-gathering
restrictions or other policies of a foreign
country or the United States”; and

•

Whether the discovery requested is
“unduly intrusive or burdensome,” in
which case the request may be rejected or
trimmed.

542 U.S. at 264-65 (citation omitted).
In the context of party requests, the lower courts
often have little to no information other than what the
applicant states in its request. And under current
practice, it is unclear who should be informed or have
participation rights when a district court receives a
request from a party. In fact, Section 1782 requests
are often considered and granted on an ex parte basis,
without prior notice to the other parties to the
international proceeding, the tribunal in which the
evidence is to be used, or the target of the discovery
request. See, e.g., Gushlak v. Gushlak, 486 F. App’x
215, 217 (2d Cir. 2012) (stating that “it is neither
uncommon nor improper for district courts to grant
applications made pursuant to § 1782 ex parte” and
listing several examples); Order, Elkind v. CCBill,
LLC, No. 2:14-mc-00030, *1 (D. Ariz. May 9, 2014)
(granting ex parte request). While the target of the
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discovery request has an opportunity to challenge it
after the request is granted and the subpoena is
served, the target is typically a nonparty who may
have no information about the dispute, the proceeding,
or the tribunal at issue, and therefore little ability to
contest the request under the Intel factors.
Making matters worse, it is currently unclear
where the burden of proof lies for the Intel factors.
Some courts place the burden on the applicant. See,
e.g., In re Babcock Borsig AG, 583 F. Supp. 2d 233, 241
(D. Mass. 2008). Others place the burden on the target
resisting discovery. See, e.g., In re Chevron Corp., 633
F.3d 153, 162 (3d Cir. 2011). When the burden is
placed on a nonparty target with no relevant
information, it is particularly difficult for the court to
conduct a full Intel analysis.
B. These Practical Difficulties Have Led
Some Lower Courts to Dilute the Intel
Factors.
The result of these practical difficulties is that the
Intel factors often do not currently function how this
Court originally envisioned that they would. In
particular, the factors have ceased to serve as effective
gatekeepers for party requests where the
international tribunal is not receptive to discovery
assistance in the United States—in large part because
lower courts are often left in the dark as to that critical
factor. Rather than permit that dysfunction to persist,
this Court should take this opportunity to clarify and
refine how the factors are intended to function and
how lower courts should apply them to achieve that
purpose.

10
The two Intel factors concerning an international
tribunal’s receptivity and the circumvention of proofgathering restrictions are often considered in tandem.
And they are central to ensuring that the statute
serves the goal of “assist[ing] foreign tribunals in
obtaining relevant information that the tribunals may
find useful.” Intel, at 262. Applying those critical
factors requires a range of information that can be
difficult for district courts to ascertain—including
whether the requested evidence is relevant to the
dispute, whether it is foreclosed by the proceeding’s
governing discovery rules, and whether the tribunal
would find the evidence useful.
District courts often have no ability to consider
these factors in a meaningful way due to information
omitted from the applicant’s request. For instance,
they have struggled to ascertain whether the
requested discovery is relevant to the dispute, 4 the
scope of discovery permitted in the proceeding at
issue, 5 and whether a similar discovery request has
already been denied by the international court or
tribunal. 6 Some district courts avoid the question by
shifting the burden of proof to the target of the Section
1782 request, requiring the target to provide
“authoritative proof” that the international tribunal is
not receptive to U.S. federal district court assistance.
See, e.g., In re Chevron Corp., 633 F.3d 153, 162 (3d
See Order, In re Application of Raoul Malak, No. 2:14-mc-00089,
*4 (D. Ariz. filed Feb 17, 2015) (Malak Application Order).

4

5 See Marubeni America Corp. v. LBA Y.K., 335 F. App’x 95, 9798 (2d Cir. 2009).
6

See In re Chevron, 633 F.3d at 162–63.
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Cir. 2011); Euromepa S.A. v. R. Esmerian, Inc., 51
F.3d 1095, 1100 (2d Cir. 1995); In re MTS Bank, No.
17-21545, 2017 WL 3155362, *6 (S.D. Fla. July 25,
2017). Especially where the target is not a party to
the international proceeding, meeting this burden is
nearly impossible.
And lower courts are now
conflicted, both between and within circuits, on who
bears the burden as to the receptivity factor. See, e.g.,
In re Schlich, 893 F.3d 40, 49 (1st Cir. 2018) (noting
that “[t]he Supreme Court has not established the
appropriate burden of proof, if any, for any of the
discretionary factors, or the legal standard required to
meet that burden” and placing the burden on neither
party); In re Babcock Borsig AG, 583 F. Supp. 2d 233,
241 (D. Mass. 2008) (placing the burden on the
proponent of discovery); In re Clerici, 481 F.3d 1324,
1335 (11th Cir. 2007) (placing the burden on neither
party). It is thus imperative that this Court provide
clarity on this issue.
District courts have also adopted other analytical
shortcuts that find no support in this Court’s Intel
decision. For instance, some courts infer receptivity
from prior federal court decisions concerning a court
or tribunal in the same jurisdiction without examining
how the prior federal court arrived at the decision or
whether one tribunal’s putative receptivity can be
imputed to another presiding over a separate
proceeding. See, e.g., Order Granting Ex Parte
Application for Order to Obtain Discovery for Use in
Foreign Proceedings, In re Ex Parte Application of
ANZ Commodity Trading Party Ltd., No. 4:17-mc80070, *6 (N.D. Cal. filed Aug. 4, 2017). Over time,
this particular shortcut has a troubling one-wayratchet effect: as the number of cases granting Section
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1782 applications accumulate, it becomes easier for
district courts to grant new requests based on old ones,
even if the old requests were incorrectly decided.
Courts have likewise adopted inaccurate
shortcuts to assess whether the requested evidence is
attainable in the absence of Section 1782 assistance.
For instance, some courts merely ask whether the
discovery target is a nonparty, assuming that the
nonparty status of the target means that the soughtafter evidence is unattainable without Section 1782.
See, e.g., Omnibus Report and Recommendations on
Motions to Intervene, Vacate, Quash Subpoenas, and
for Protective Order, In re Application of H.M.B.
Limited Pursuant to 28 USC 1782 to Conduct
Discovery for Use in Foreign Proceedings, No. 1:17-cv21459, *17 (S.D. Fla. filed July 2, 2018). Taking
advantage of that doctrinal shortcut, many discovery
requests strategically target a nonparty although the
same evidence is also held by the opposing party in the
international
proceeding
and
is
potentially
discoverable through the procedures applicable in that
proceeding.
These strategically chosen nonparties include
American corporate affiliates of the opposing party
and American law firms that received the requested
evidence for the purpose of representing the opposing
party in U.S. proceedings. See, e.g., Bravo Express
Corp v Total Petrochemicals & Refining USA, Inc., 613
F. App’x 319, 320–21 (5th Cir. 2015) (seeking
discovery from U.S. targets that had a corporate
relationship and joint business operations with the
entities that were party to the underlying proceeding);
Application for an Order Directing ASML US, Inc. to
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Respond to Requests for Documents Pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1782 For Use in Foreign Proceedings, No.
1:17-mc-00142, *8 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2017) (seeking
discovery from the wholly owned subsidiary of the
opposing party in the foreign proceeding); Kiobel by
Samkalden v Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP, 895 F.3d
238, 241 (2d Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 852
(2019) (seeking evidence that was sent to an American
law firm “solely . . . for the purpose of American
litigation”) (citation omitted). The target’s nonparty
status is thus not enough to conclude that the
international tribunal cannot obtain the requested
evidence absent Section 1782. 7
II. This Court Should Clarify The Intel Factors
And Strengthen The Procedure For
Evaluating Section 1782 Requests.
If this Court concludes that Section 1782 applies
to international commercial arbitrations, then it
should take the opportunity to resolve the practical
difficulties currently plaguing the lower courts’
application of the Intel factors. Indeed, in Intel itself,
this Court noted that it might later revisit the factors
it articulated following “further experience with
§ 1782(a) applications in the lower courts.” Intel, 542
U.S. at 265. That is precisely what amicus’ detailed
scholarly research and analysis now provides:
7
In addition, Intel instructed that “unduly intrusive or
burdensome requests may be rejected or trimmed.” 542 U.S. at
265 (citations omitted). This factor, too, has been weakened over
time. Since Intel, courts have held that it is preferable to modify
a request rather than deny it altogether. See, e.g., Bravo Express
Corp v Total Petrochemicals & Refining USA, Inc., 613 F. App’x
319, 325 (5th Cir. 2015).
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evidence from over a decade’s worth of lower court
experience. As detailed above, that data reveals an
urgent need to refine and clarify Intel’s discretionary
factors. In particular, if the Intel factors are to play
the critical gatekeeping role that this Court
envisioned, they require more active participation
from international tribunals and opposing parties, as
well as appropriately placed burdens of proof. And
this case is a perfect opportunity to provide that
necessary clarity to the lower courts.
A. This Court Should Require Applicants to
Provide
Notice
of
Section
1782
Proceedings
to
All
Parties
and
International Tribunals.
The core problems distorting lower courts’
application of the Intel factors stem from the fact that
the most relevant actors—the parties to the
international proceeding and the tribunal itself—are
often absent from Section 1782 proceedings. As a
result, the key questions at the heart of the Intel
factors are often unanswerable. And the solution is
remarkably simple: this Court should clarify that
Section 1782 applicants must timely serve the target
of discovery, all parties to the proceedings for which
the evidence is to be used, and all tribunals before
which the evidence is to be used.
In fact, a number of lower courts have already
recognized the critical value that notice can provide.
Although, under current practice, Section 1782
applications are often made and granted ex parte,
there is an emerging practice of lower courts requiring
notice. In a handful of cases, district courts have
ordered applicants to notify the target of the discovery
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request, 8 the adversary against whom the evidence is
to be used, 9 and the international tribunal itself. 10
The natural result has been that those courts have
been able to conduct the actual analysis that this
Court set forth in Intel—without having to rely on
distortive short-cuts or dubious assumptions.
Moreover, requiring Section 1782 applicants to
provide notice to all parties is consistent with the
approach taken in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure for domestic discovery. In particular, Rule
45(a)(4) mandates that notice and a copy of a nonparty
subpoena be served on each party to the dispute before
it can be served on a nonparty target, so that other
parties have an opportunity to object, to monitor the
discovery, and to seek access to the information
produced or make additional discovery requests of
See, e.g., Order, In re Application of Halliburton SAS, No. 1:14mc-00004, *2 (E.D. Va. filed Feb 4, 2014) (“Halliburton
Application Order”); In re Ex Parte Application of Apple, Inc,
Apple Retail Germany GmBh, and Apple Sales International, No.
3:12-cv00179, *1 (S.D. Cal. filed Feb 1, 2012) (“Apple Application
Order”); Order to Show Cause Why this Court Should Not Grant
Ecuadorean Plaintiffs’ Ex Parte Application for Expedited
Service and Enforcement of Subpoenas to Conduct Discovery for
Use in Foreign Proceeding Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782, In re
Application of Daniel Carlos Lusitand Yaiguaje, No. 3:11-mc80087, *2 (N.D. Cal. filed May 9, 2011) (“Yaiguaje Application
Order”).
8

9 See, e.g., Halliburton Application Order at *2 (ordering that
applicant provide notice to a number of relevant parties); Apple
Application Order at *1 (same); Yaiguaje Application Order at *2
(same).

See, e.g., Order, In re Application Pursuant to 28 USC § 1782
of Financial Guaranty Insurance Co v. Lehman Brothers, Inc.,
No. 1:11-mc-00085, *2 (S.D.N.Y. filed Mar 29, 2011).
10
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their own. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 45, Notes of the Advisory
Committee on Rules—2013 Amendment, Note to
Subdivision (a). And Rule 30(b)(1) requires similar
notice in the context of nonparty depositions.
There is no reason why this Court cannot require
a similar notice process when federal courts are asked
to order discovery for use in international proceedings.
Indeed, some lower courts have explicitly relied on
Rule 45 in imposing notice requirements in Section
1782 proceedings. See, e.g., In re Hornbeam Corp., 722
F. App’x 7, 10-11 (2d Cir. 2018); Request to File Under
Seal, In re Application of Lúcia de Araujo Bertolla for
an Order Pursuant to 28 USC § 1782 to Obtain
Discovery for Use in a Foreign Proceeding, No. 1:17mc-00284, *1 (S.D.N.Y. filed April 25, 2018). Other
courts have relied on other similar grounds to impose
an analogous requirement.
See, e.g., Order by
Magistrate Judge Arthur Nakazato, In re Ex Parte
Application of Nokia Corp., No. 8:13-mc-00010, *1
(C.D. Cal. filed May 15, 2013); In re Merck & Co, Inc.,
197 F.R.D. 267, 270–71 (M.D. N.C. 2000). Ultimately,
this Court need not directly root a notice requirement
in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rather, the
same inherent power the Court possessed to articulate
the Intel factors necessarily affords it the authority to
ensure that those factors are meaningfully and
accurately applied.
Experience has shown that such a notice
requirement is necessary for the effective operation of
the Intel factors. In particular, if a federal court is to
accurately assess an international tribunal’s
receptivity to U.S. discovery assistance, it is
imperative that the international tribunal is actually
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notified that its views would be helpful. In fact, in the
domestic discovery context, the Federal Rules
encourage precisely that form of coordination when a
second federal judge in a different jurisdiction than
where the main litigation is being heard is called on to
adjudicate disputes over a nonparty subpoena. The
judge tasked with adjudicating the subpoena is
encouraged to consult with the judge presiding over
the main case, since the latter is more familiar with
the underlying dispute. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 45, Notes
of the Advisory Committee on Rules—2013
Amendment, Note to Subdivision (f). In the domestic
context, motions can also be transferred back to the
court presiding over the main case so as not to disrupt
that court’s supervision over the underlying litigation.
See id. When the tribunal supervising the proceeding
is international, such consultation is even more
critical because the federal district court adjudicating
the Section 1782 request is unfamiliar not only with
the underlying case but also with the international
tribunal’s discovery procedures.
The Court should also clarify that, once notified,
international tribunals and other affected parties are
encouraged to express their views on the Section 1782
request and the Intel factors. Surprisingly, lower
courts have disagreed on this topic.
While
international tribunals are increasingly participating
in Section 1782 proceedings, they have occasionally
been precluded from participating.
See, e.g.,
Memorandum and Order, In re Application of
Microsoft Corp, No. 1:06-mc-10061, *6 n.4 (D. Mass.
filed Apr. 17, 2006). Similarly, district courts have
debated whether an adverse party in the international
proceeding has standing to participate in a Section
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1782 request. Compare In re Kleimar N.V. v. Benxi
Iron and Steel America, Ltd., No. 17-cv-01287, 2017
WL 3386115, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 7, 2017) (“[T]here is
no question that an entity against whom the discovery
will be used has standing to challenge an order
allowing discovery under § 1782.”), with Order, In re
Application of Chevron, No. 1:10-mc-00001, *1
(S.D.N.Y. filed Aug 24, 2010) (noting that the plaintiffs
in the foreign proceeding for which discovery was
sought, “whose standing in this matter is debatable to
say the least,” had moved to strike some of the filings
submitted by the § 1782 applicant, who happened to
be the defendant in the foreign proceeding).
B. This Court Should Clarify that Section
1782 Applicants Bear the Burden of
Establishing that Their Requests Satisfy
the Intel Factors.
In addition, the Court should specify that the
burden of proof with respect to the Intel analysis falls
on the Section 1782 applicant, who seeks to enlist the
federal court’s assistance with discovery for an
international proceeding. Here, too, this clarification
is consistent with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, and federal law in general. See Herbert v.
Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 157 (1979) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P.
26); Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 49,
56–58 (2005) (“We therefore begin with the ordinary
default rule that plaintiffs bear the risk of failing to
prove their claims. . . . Decisions that place the entire
burden of persuasion on the opposing party at the
outset of a proceeding . . . are extremely rare.”).
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Most important, the burden should rest with the
applicant to show that the international tribunal is
receptive to U.S. discovery assistance and that the
request is not an attempt to circumvent the tribunal’s
proof-gathering framework.
Aside from the
international tribunal itself, the Section 1782
applicant is in the best position to supply the
necessary information to assess those factors. And
placing the burden on the applicant will only further
encourage notice to the international tribunal, so that
it can offer its views directly. Likewise, the applicant
is plainly in the best position to establish whether the
evidence is unattainable without U.S. discovery
assistance. At the very least, the Court should clarify
that it is not sufficient merely to identify the target as
a nonparty to the international proceeding without
also establishing that the same evidence is not within
“the possession, custody, or control” of a party—the
standard scope of discovery under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(ii),
34(a)(1), 45(a)(1)(A)(iii).
C. Clarifying the Intel Factors Will Reduce
Abuse of Section 1782 and Strengthen
the Framework this Court Envisioned.
By requiring notice and placing the burden of
persuasion on the applicant, this Court would curtail
abuse of Section 1782 and ensure that lower courts are
able to conduct the actual analysis required by Intel.
In the process, the Court will also resolve the policy
arguments that some lower courts and parties have
relied upon to exclude international commercial
arbitrations from Section 1782’s reach.
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For requests connected to pending arbitrations
and litigations, the above changes will better align
district court decisions with the preferences of the
international tribunals they are assisting. Indeed, as
the European Commission argued in the amicus brief
it filed in Intel, a district court “can only weigh fairly”
a foreign or international tribunal’s “complex
interests . . . in aiding or blocking a Section 1782
discovery request if it is made aware of those
interests.” Brief of Amicus Curiae the Commission of
the European Communities Supporting Reversal,
Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., No. 02572, 2003 WL 23138389, at *17 (9th Cir. Dec. 23,
2003). But “there is no system for providing it with
notice of Section 1782 cases in which [a tribunal’s]
interests are at stake, much less any regular
procedure through which [the tribunal] might appear
and make those interests known.” Id.
The limited instances in which an international
tribunal’s interests have been solicited reveal that
they have diverse preferences that district courts
cannot easily divine. For instance, a Swiss arbitrator
has conveyed nonreceptivity to Section 1782
discovery, see El Paso Corp. v. La Comision Ejecutiva
Hidroelectrica del Rio Lempa, 341 F. App’x 31, 32 (5th
Cir. 2009), while an Israeli arbitrator has expressed
receptivity, see In re Hallmark Capital Corp., 534 F.
Supp. 2d 951, 957 (D. Minn. 2007). The arbitral
tribunal in this very case issued a decision stating its
preference that U.S. courts in the Northern District of
Illinois and the District of South Carolina be
permitted to hear Servotronics’ requests on their
merits, leaving it to the international tribunal to
determine whether any material obtained pursuant to
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the Section 1782 application would subsequently be
relevant or admissible in the arbitration. See Third
Interim Award, In the Matter of an Arbitration Under
the Rules of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators
Between Rolls Royce PLC and Servotronics Inc., No.
20-mc-00081-JRT-KMM, Dkt. No. 23-1, at 10, 12 (D.
Minn. filed Mar. 9, 2021).
Indeed, these clarifications would also address
some of the policy concerns that feature prominently
in the Second, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits’ decisions
excluding international commercial arbitration from
Section 1782’s reach. One such concern is the
discrepancy between Section 1782, which permits
parties to invoke the power of federal district courts to
obtain nonparty evidence, and Section 7 of the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA), which only permits arbitrators
to do so. See National Broadcasting Co., 165 F.3d at
187; Republic of Kazakhstan v. Biedermann Int’l, 168
F.3d 880, 883 (5th Cir. 1999); Servotronics, Inc, 975
F.3d at 695. By aligning district court decisions with
the preferences of arbitrators presiding over tribunals,
the notice requirement would reduce tension between
Section 1782 and the FAA. While Section 1782 need
not be in perfect unison with the FAA—Intel’s
rejection of both the foreign discoverability
requirement and the requirement that the soughtafter discovery be discoverable in an analogous U.S.
proceeding made such equivalence unnecessary—
harmony among the regimes is clearly preferable.
Meanwhile,
for
requests
connected
to
contemplated proceedings that have not yet been filed,
the above clarifications would ensure that Section
1782 is not misused. Currently, applicants can
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circumvent many of the factors in such “contemplated
requests,” perversely making it easier to obtain
intrusive discovery for hypothetical claims that have
not even been initiated. But requiring applicants to
notify the relevant international tribunal and
opposing parties would limit the circumstances in
which parties seek to enlist federal courts in abusive
fishing expeditions. This is certainly the case for
international commercial arbitrations, because the
tribunal is typically constituted after the arbitration
has commenced, and only then does the tribunal set
the procedures that govern the arbitration. See
generally Arif H. Ali, et al., The International
Arbitration Rulebook: A Guide to Arbitral Regimes
(2019). In fact, with the above clarifications, several
appellate
decisions
excluding
international
commercial arbitration from Section 1782’s ambit
would reach the same outcome without the categorical
exclusion. See National Broadcasting Co., 165 F.3d at
186 (noting that the underlying arbitral proceeding
was contemplated and the arbitration panel not yet
appointed); El Paso Corp., 341 F. App’x at 32 (noting
that the arbitral tribunal had issued an order
indicating it was not receptive to U.S. discovery).
III. Clarifying The Intel Factors Is Preferable To
Adopting Illusory Distinctions That Would
Exclude “Private” Commercial Arbitrations
From Section 1782’s Reach.
Finally, to the extent that this Court is concerned
by the policy arguments raised against including
international commercial arbitrations within Section
1782’s reach, these critical clarifications are a
preferable avenue for properly calibrating Section
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1782’s scope than adopting an illusory distinction for
“private” commercial arbitration while including other
arbitrations with similar features.
In reality, international arbitral tribunals are not
readily classified as “private” or “governmental”
because they come in many varieties and rely on
differing degrees of both state authority and private
contract.
Virtually all international arbitrations
function within the frameworks set forth in
international treaties, other inter-governmental
agreements, and implementing legislation.
For
instance, the Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10,
1958, 21 U.S.T. 2519, T.I.A.S. No. 6997 (the New York
Convention), binds over 160 state parties and
obligates the courts of those countries to recognize and
enforce international commercial arbitral awards
rendered in other state parties. The United States is
bound by this Convention, which is incorporated into
U.S. law at Chapter 2 of the FAA. Many countries
have also adopted, in whole or in part, the Model
Arbitration Law promulgated by the United Nations
Commission
on
International
Trade
Law
(UNCITRAL), which regulates the interaction
between national courts and international arbitral
tribunals.
And investor-state arbitrations are
authorized by bilateral and multilateral investment
treaties that permit the private investors of one
contracting state to bring claims directly against
another contracting state.
Many bilateral and multilateral investment
treaties provide for arbitrations to be brought at the
International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes (ICSID), which was established under the
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Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
Between States and Nationals, March 18, 1965, 575
U.N.T.S. 159, and operates under the auspices of the
World Bank. But some investment treaties also
specify other international arbitration regimes such
as the International Court of Arbitration of the
International Chamber of Commerce (excluded from
Section 1782 by the Second Circuit in National
Broadcasting Co.) or the Arbitration Institute of the
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (excluded from
Section 1782 by the Fifth Circuit in Biedermann).
Excluding “private” commercial arbitration
ignores the reality that the distinction between
“private” and “governmental” arbitral tribunals would
be exceptionally difficult for lower courts to apply. As
one example, when attempting to classify the China
International Economic and Trade Arbitration
Commission (CIETAC), the Second Circuit recently
articulated a vague, multi-factor test on top of Intel’s
existing factors. To determine whether CIETAC is a
“private” international arbitration outside the scope of
Section 1782, the Second Circuit considered “a range
of factors, including the degree of state affiliation and
functional independence possessed by the entity, as
well as the degree to which the parties’ contract
controls the panel’s jurisdiction.” In re Guo, 965 F.3d
96, 107 (2d Cir. 2020). And the lines are growing ever
blurrier.
In recent years, the establishment of
adjudicatory institutions around the world that
function somewhere between courts and arbitral
tribunals have further muddied the traditional
distinction between public and private adjudication.
See generally Pamela K. Bookman, Arbitral Courts, 61
Va. J. Int’l L. 161 (2021).
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For these reasons, the Court should resolve any
concern with Section 1782’s use within international
commercial arbitrations by clarifying how lower
courts should apply the Intel factors, rather than
adopting a highly fraught and illusory distinction that
would place “private” or “commercial” arbitration
entirely outside of Section 1782’s ambit. Indeed, as
explained above, requiring notice and placing the
burden of proof on Section 1782 applicants will restore
the gatekeeping role that the Intel factors were
established to play. And requiring courts to conduct a
meaningful analysis of those factors will weed out the
abusive and improper claims that seem to motivate
lower court decisions that have categorically excluded
international commercial arbitrations from Section
1782’s reach.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, amicus curiae
respectfully urges the Court to clarify the Intel factors
in light of the extensive experience detailed in amicus’
research and scholarly analysis on Section 1782’s
application in the lower courts.
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